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Abstract 
This study explores the potential of crowdfunding as a tool for achieving “citizen co-funding” 
of public projects. Focusing on philanthropic crowdfunding, we examine whether collaborative 
projects between public and private organizations are more successful in fundraising than 
projects initiated solely by private organizations. We argue that government involvement in 
crowdfunding provides some type of accreditation or certification that attests to a project’s aim 
to achieve public rather than private goals, thereby mitigating information asymmetry and 
improving mutual trust between creators (i.e., private sector organizations) and funders (i.e., 
crowd). To support this argument, we show that crowdfunding projects with government 
involvement achieved a greater success rate and attracted a greater amount of funding than 
comparable projects without government involvement. This evidence shows that governments 
may take advantage of crowdfunding to “co-fund” public projects with the citizenry for 
addressing the complex challenges that we face in the twenty-first century.  
Keywords: crowdfunding, collaborative innovation, public-private partnerships, public sector 
innovation, information asymmetry, moral hazard 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Crowdfunding is an increasingly popular and widespread form of online fundraising, whereby 
small individual contributions made through an online platform by the crowd are pooled to 
fund a project and achieve a particular goal. Research has reported that a rapidly growing 
volume of money is collected through crowdfunding in many parts of the world (Agrawal, 
Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2014; Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2014; Burtch, Ghose, 
& Wattal, 2013; Mollick, 2014; Mollick & Nanda, 2015; Mayer, 2016, 2018; Hong & Ryu, 
2018). For instance, according to a report by Massolution, a research firm analyzing 
crowdfunding market trends, the worldwide fundraising volume through crowdfunding was 
estimated to be 34 billion USD in 2015, a more than tenfold increase from 2.7 billion USD in 
2012.  
Somewhat puzzling evidence indicates that many crowdfunding projects are successful in 
fundraising, even if their expected returns are very low or even negative (Boudreau, Jeppesen, 
Reichstein, & Rullani, 2015; Evans, 2015; Griffin, 2012; Hazen, 2011). That is, the reward 
structure of many crowdfunding projects closely resembles charitable donations; people make 
voluntary contributions to public goods through crowdfunding platforms (Boudreau et al., 
2015). In order to explain this conundrum, many researchers have proposed that crowdfunders 
may enjoy some intangible rewards from their participation (Burtch et al., 2013). Such an 
observation is not limited to philanthropic crowdfunding but applies more generally to a much 
wider class of projects, including entrepreneurial ones (Boudreau et al., 2015).  
The evidence that crowdfunding resembles charitable donations suggests that it could 
potentially be used to address not only private but also public missions. Recognizing this 
potential, governments in many parts of the world have started to actively engage in partnering 
with non-profit sectors to initiate projects through crowdfunding platforms (Lee, Zhao, & 
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Hassna, 2016; Miglietta, Parisi, Pessione, & Servato, 2014; Hong & Ryu, 2018). However, 
despite the growing participation of governments in the crowdfunding industry, little is known 
about whether and how they may take advantage of this innovation to achieve public goals. 
The lack of scholarly attention to public-private partnerships in crowdfunding is an important 
omission in the literature, given that many governments around the world are already actively 
utilizing it. For instance, in Korea, where the evidence of this study comes from, a large number 
of local and central government agencies have started to actively use crowdfunding platforms 
to fund various projects that could potentially contribute to public missions. Commentators 
have applauded this trend as a remarkable innovation in the way in which governments operate. 
However, to our best knowledge, no empirical evidence exists to support this claim.  
In this study, we follow previous research (e.g., de Vries, Hanna, Bekkers, & Tummers, 
2016) and define “public sector innovation” generally as public organizations’ adoption of “an 
idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” 
(Rogers, 2003, 12). De Vries et al. (2016) proposed four specific types of innovation: (1) 
process innovation, (2) product or service innovation, (3) governance innovation, and (4) 
conceptual innovation. Among the four types, public-sector crowdfunding may be classified as 
an example of both process and governance innovations as it offers a new process as well as a 
new form of governance for addressing societal problems. Crowdfunding offers a new process 
in which governments can solicit creative solutions from nonprofit organizations (NPOs) for a 
given social problem, and collect contributions from a large number of funders more efficiently 
than before.1 It also enables a new form of collaborative governance in which stakeholders 
                                           
1 The so-called sharing economy generally involves peer-to-peer-based activities of sharing the access to goods 
or services, as coordinated through an online platform (Hong & Lee, 2018a, 2018b). Crowdfunding is often 
classified as a specific type of sharing economy as it involves peer-to peer financing (Hamari, Sjöklint & Ukkonen, 
2016). 
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pool their innovation assets to develop joint solutions for social problems. Specifically, the 
government oversees the whole process while steering the overall direction of social 
investments and signaling that a project aims to achieve social rather than private goals. NPOs 
use their expertise to propose creative and specific solutions for solving the social problems set 
forth by the government. Funders evaluate the proposed solutions by contributing to the 
projects they value. 
Governments’ use of crowdfunding may be regarded as a public sector innovation with 
normative and economic benefits. First, crowdfunding may be reconcilable with democratic 
values as it “democratizes” financing. The amount of money raised by crowdfunding may serve 
as a credible proxy for the collective demand (i.e., needs) of the citizenry for the projects; 
crowdfunding allows citizens to “vote with their dollars” online to bring ideas into reality. 
Second, crowdfunding may especially be useful for governments to carry forward politically 
contentious public services. Taxpayers would be against the idea that their money is spent on 
projects that do not fit with their political views, but they may care less if the money is raised 
from the voluntary contributions of crowdfunders. That is, with crowdfunding, governments 
may be shielded from criticisms that they pursue projects to serve their own benefits or political 
ideology, rather than achieve broader public missions. Third, crowdfunding may also allow for 
the funding of public projects without distorting the choices of those who pay for the projects. 
In contrast, taxation has generally negative impacts on social welfare as it distorts taxpayers’ 
choices; for instance, if the wage tax rate increases, then laborers decide to work less. Such a 
welfare loss does not accrue in crowdfunded public projects, as citizens’ voluntarily donations 
do not distort their own economic activities.  
In this study, we evaluate the potential of crowdfunding as a tool for achieving innovation 
in the public sector. We argue that governments may use crowdfunding to collaborate with the 
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private sector to achieve a public mission. That is, a crowdfunding platform may function as 
an online infrastructure where a public-private sector collaboration or partnership may be 
formed to address the complex challenges that we face in the twenty-first century. To test this 
argument, we focus on philanthropic crowdfunding and examine whether collaborative projects 
of public and private organizations are more successful in fundraising than projects initiated 
solely by private organizations. This empirical investigation aims to establish whether 
government involvement significantly improves the capability of private sector organizations 
(e.g., philanthropic organizations) in soliciting citizen contributions to public goals, in which 
case crowdfunding may be used to solve various collective action problems.  
Overall, findings suggest that, with all else being equal, government involvement has 
significant positive impacts on crowdfunding performance, as measured by success rate and 
funding amount. To explain this finding, we hypothesize that the participation of government 
agencies could improve crowdfunding performance by mitigating the information asymmetry 
between the creator (i.e., the private sector organization) and funders (i.e., the crowd). 
Specifically, we argue that government involvement provides some type of accreditation or 
certification that attests that crowdfunding projects truly aim to achieve public rather than private 
goals, ultimately improving citizens’ trust in the projects. In what follows, we show evidence 
that supports this hypothesis.  
 
2. PUBLIC SERVICE INNOVATION AND CROWDFUNDING 
In many parts of the world, public sector organizations are faced with the growing needs of 
social programs to address health, inequality, and aging issues, while at the same time 
experiencing severe resource constraints. In response, there is considerable interest in how 
governments may become more innovative in addressing such challenges (Arundel, Casali, & 
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Hollanders, 2015; Borins, 2008; Osborne & Brown, 2011; Hartley, Sørensen, & Torfing, 2013; 
Bugge & Bloch, 2016; Demircioglu, 2017; Demircioglu & Audretsch, 2017). However, despite 
such interest, prior research has focused primarily on how private sector organizations innovate 
but have paid little attention to the public sector context. This paucity of research is surprising, 
given that innovation in the public sector generally has significant spill-over; its benefits reach 
far beyond the public sector’s boundaries (e.g., Julnes & Gibson, 2015; Torfing & Triantafillou, 
2016).  
Prior research has identified several broad strategies that can be implemented by public 
sector organizations to foster innovation (Hartley et al., 2013). Among them, this study focuses 
on the strategies that rely on the idea that collaborative governance involving both public and 
private actors can prompt and sustain public sector innovation. This type of strategy is often 
called “collaborative innovation.” The rationale underlying collaborative innovation mainly 
stems from theories of network governance and organizational learning that emphasize how 
collaborative processes involving a broad range of actors are conducive to finding innovative 
solutions to complex problems (e.g., Engestrom, 2008; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Clark, 
Brudney, & Jang, 2013; Collm & Schedler, 2014; Scupola & Zanfei 2016; Gascó, 2017; 
Lindsay et al. 2017). The primary driving force of collaborative innovation may be that such 
participatory governance opens up the innovation processes to a wide range of stakeholders 
facing common problems (Bommert, 2010; Hartley et al., 2013; Lindsay et al. 2017). Those 
stakeholders, having a comparative advantage in different innovation assets, are integrated into 
the innovation cycle to pool their assets and develop joint solutions (Bommert, 2010; Hartley 
et al., 2013).  
Although scholars generally agree with the benefits of collaborative approaches in 
innovation, they also point out the difficulties in forming a well-functioning partnership for 
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collaboration. Prior research identified the lack of trust among participating actors as a key 
barrier against collaboration (e.g., Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Thomas, 2003; Huxham & 
Vangen, 2005; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006, 2015; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2008; Hong 
& Kim, 2018; see also Kelman, Hong, & Turbitt, 2012). In fact, collaborative governance may 
not be sustainable if participating organizations are concerned about the opportunism (more 
formally “moral hazard”) of other participants. Moral hazard is a significant concern, 
especially when asymmetric information exists among participating organizations (Hölmstrom, 
1979). Therefore, the formation of a successful collaborative partnership rests on whether and 
how information is shared among partners, at least before mutual trust is formed. As building 
trust among participants is not always feasible (e.g., too time-consuming), maintaining a high 
level of information transparency is crucial in expanding the network of any collaborative 
governance (e.g., Bellamy, Raab, Warren, & Heeney, 2007).  
The recent development of information technology and online infrastructure, including 
crowdfunding platforms, has transformed the landscape of collaborative governance and 
innovation. For instance, crowdfunding provides an unprecedented potential for any person or 
organization with innovative ideas to overcome their resource constraints through small 
contributions by the public. However, it should be noted that information asymmetry may be 
especially problematic in crowdfunding due to the large number of investors (Strausz, 2017). 
Due to asymmetric information, funders may not reveal their true preferences, whereas creators 
may embezzle the collected fund. This is where the role of governments comes in. In this study, 
we show that the government participation in crowdfunding projects contributes to the 
formation of collaboration by mitigating the information asymmetry between the creator and 
funders.  
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3. BACKGROUND: GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN CROWDFUNDING 
This study’s evidence is based on observations from a major Korean crowdfunding platform, 
Wadiz, and was collected from March to December 2016. A Korean platform was selected as 
a case study because of the Korean government’s active involvement in the crowdfunding 
industry. The so-called “Crowdfunding Law” 2  was approved by the Korean National 
Assembly in July 2015 and took effect in January 2016. This law terminated the severe 
financial regulations that had been imposed on crowdfunding; as a result, the crowdfunding 
industry came to face a lighter regulatory burden than other traditional financial industries. 
Subsequently, the Korean government announced the “Crowdfunding Promotion Plan” in 
January 2016 to encourage collaborations among various public authorities (i.e., both central 
and local government agencies) and private sector organizations for crowdfunding to promote 
entrepreneurship and economy. These endeavors produced a substantial number of cases in 
which government agencies and NPOs formed collaborative partnerships through 
crowdfunding platforms.  
Wadiz was founded in May 2012 by a group of entrepreneurs and was officially approved 
by the Korean government as a crowdfunding platform in January 2016. As of December 2017, 
Wadiz is by far the largest crowdfunding platform in Korea, with a cumulative fundraising 
amount of 44.4 billion Korean Won (which translates into about 40 million USD). On this 
platform, there are two types of crowdfunding project models: equity-based and reward-based 
models. The equity-based models are similar to angel investments, in which the funders 
become shareholders who receive financial rewards based on the realized profits. On the other 
hand, the reward-based models provide only nonfinancial rewards to the funders. Many 
                                           
2 Amendment to the “Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act.”  
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projects give funders some small souvenirs; for instance, an NPO that aims to support people 
who are blind or with low vision gave a braille bracelet to funders. As the reward-based model 
does not provide any substantial amount of financial rewards in exchange for contributions, 
these projects may be viewed as charitable donation-based crowdfunding, commonly observed 
in major international platforms such as Kickstarter. The reward-based models are further 
classified into eleven categories including technology, fashion and beauty, food, design, online 
cartoons, video games, book publishing, arts, travel, sports, and public projects. The sample 
used in this study includes all crowdfunding projects that are classified as “public projects” and 
that appeared on the site from March to December 2016. 
The roles of government agencies in crowdfunding projects vary to some extent, but the 
government’s primary function is to determine areas for their involvement and perform 
“screening” (i.e., the selection of projects that are feasible and may contribute to public 
missions). Specifically, the government first announces some broad areas of support and 
involvement (e.g., promotion of well-being in rural regions). They then solicit creative 
solutions from private sector organizations (i.e., NPOs) to address the social problems related 
to the announced areas; such solicitations may be viewed as the crowdsourcing of ideas 
reported in previous literature (Linders, 2012; Mergel & Desouza, 2013; Maheshwari & 
Janssen, 2014; Mergel, 2015a, 2015b; Sieber & Johnson, 2015; Moon, 2018). Next, the 
government conducts reviews of crowdfunding proposals submitted by NPOs and individuals, 
and selects those projects that are feasible, fit the announced areas of involvement, and have 
significant potential to contribute to public missions if properly funded and carried forward. 
The selected projects are delivered to the crowdfunding platform and identified as such. For 
instance, Wadiz shows a message such as “this project is pursued as a collaboration with [the 
name of public agencies].” As explained above, such government involvement is mainly 
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pursued in “public projects,” as classified by the platform.  
Governments’ involvement in crowdfunding projects may be viewed as a case of 
collaborative innovation for the following reasons. First, crowdfunding public projects allow 
governments, NPOs, and funders to focus on their own comparative advantages; each party 
brings distinct capabilities to create potentially greater synergy in the collaboration (Bryson et 
al., 2006; Austin & Seitanidi, 2012; Hong & Kim, 2018). The government provides the 
accreditation that a project aims to achieve social rather than private goals (Rivenbark & 
Menter, 2006). NPOs may reduce their fundraising costs and rather focus on their key areas of 
expertise (i.e., management of the project). Funders may be more willing to share their 
resources as they become less concerned about potential embezzlement. Second, although the 
involved stakeholders seem to act independently, they work to achieve a common public goal. 
That is, the crowdfunding platform enables stakeholders to pool their innovation assets for the 
development of joint solutions. Specifically, the government steers the direction of social 
investments by identifying areas that need more care and also monitors the opportunism of 
nonprofit partners. NPOs implement and manage the projects, while funders provide voluntary 
contributions based on their evaluations of the projects’ social values. Here, although all the 
stakeholders may not necessarily participate in mutual decision-making as is common in many 
traditional forms of collaborative governance, the crowdsourcing platform allows them to 
produce a joint solution for achieving a common goal.  
 
4. HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Information Asymmetry and Government Participation 
Previous research in corporate finance has well reported how the existence of information 
asymmetry, a situation where the firm has more or better information than investors, may 
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present a barrier to efficient financing and investment decisions (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This 
insight extends to the case in which an NPO attracts contributions from the citizenry. Citizens 
have little information about how the donation will be spent once the contribution is made; it 
may be spent to address social problems as announced by the NPO, but it may also be used for 
the organization’s own interests—a problem termed as “moral hazard.” In the context of 
crowdfunding, there may exist information asymmetry between the creator (i.e., the NPO) and 
the funder (i.e., the crowd), which may lead to a potential moral hazard for the creator.  
Information asymmetry may distort the outcome of crowdfunding in two different ways. 
First, the creator may embezzle some of the collected finance, which represents the 
abovementioned moral hazard. Second, expecting the risks of a moral hazard, the crowd may 
abstain from contributing. That is, even those who fully sympathize with and support the 
missions of the nonprofit organization may be unwilling to contribute due to the uncertainty 
involved in how the contribution will be spent. In sum, the information asymmetry problem 
has a distortive effect on the choices of both the creator and the funders. In what follows, this 
study focuses on the latter (i.e., the crowd’s abstention from contribution due to information 
asymmetry) and shows how a public-private partnership in crowdfunding may contribute to 
reducing this distortion.3  
To be more specific, this information asymmetry problem may be mitigated under certain 
conditions. For instance, the distortion will be less significant if the creator has a good 
reputation and is trusted by the public (Van Slyke, 2006). However, we focus in this study on 
two variables among the many possible factors: (1) the creator’s effort to maintain a high level 
                                           
3 Government involvement may also reduce the transaction costs of the crowdfunding process. For instance, 
without government support, private sector organizations may have to work to improve the transparency of their 
activities, which may be costly. Government involvement thus reduces the need for these activities, which may 
be seen as resulting in a decrease in the transaction costs of the crowdfunding process. 
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of transparency, and (2) government involvement. We hypothesize that these two factors may 
significantly reduce information asymmetry in crowdfunding projects.  
 
4.2 Government Participation and Crowd Fundraising 
Prior research has emphasized the critical importance of transparency for the successful 
management of NPOs. Specifically, the voluntary disclosure of information by NPOs may have 
a significantly positive impact on the amount of donations by improving donor perceptions 
(Gandía, 2011). Further, the availability of the Internet is found to be conducive to an 
environment in which NPOs can more effectively achieve a high level of transparency (Gandía, 
2011).  
The same logic may extend to the case where NPOs reach out to crowdfunding platforms 
in order to expand their donor base. Previous research has stressed the importance of 
maintaining transparency for the successful performance of crowdfunding activities (e.g., 
Carvajal, García-Avilés, & González, 2012; Gerber & Hui, 2013). In fact, a greater level of 
transparency achieved by the creator’s voluntary information disclosure may promote 
crowdfunders’ trust in the project, resulting in an increase in the amount of contributions. In 
other words, with a greater level of transparency, the public may become less worried about 
the potential moral hazard of the NPOs, and thus may more willingly participate in the project. 
Therefore, we have the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: A greater level of transparency achieved by the creator’s voluntary information 
disclosure may improve crowdfunders’ trust, thereby resulting in an increase in 
contributions.  
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To be clear, this benefit of transparency stems from the distrust between the creator and funders; 
the information asymmetry creates a concern for funders about the creator’s potential moral 
hazard behaviors (e.g., embezzlement of the contributions). Besides the creator’s effort for 
information disclosure, we argue that governments’ participation in, or support of, 
crowdfunding projects may also function as an instrument for improving the funders’ trust, 
thereby leading to an increase in the amount of contributions. In the case of government 
participation, governments and NPOs jointly create a crowdfunding project; in contrast, 
government support may take a variety of different modes, including government subsidy 
(provided as matching funds to crowdfunding, for instance), a review of the project’s feasibility 
and social desirability, ex-post investigation of the creator’s moral hazard, and so on. Thus, we 
argue that government participation or support of crowdfunding projects will also result in an 
increase in the amount of contributions. In this vein, the following hypothesis is proposed;  
 
H2: Government participation or support of crowdfunding projects may improve 
crowdfunders’ trust, thereby resulting in an increase in contributions. 
 
The above hypothesis may be generalizable to a wide variety of forms of government 
involvement. However, among the many possible forms, this study explores the effect of 
arguably the weakest form of government involvement: a government agency conducts a 
review of the ideas underlying crowdfunding projects in terms of their feasibility and social 
desirability and provides certification that the projects are in line with public missions.  
We have thus far explained that both the creator’s effort to improve transparency and 
government support may have positive effects on the performance of crowd-based financing. 
An important insight is that both variables mitigate information asymmetry and improve the 
crowd’s trust. The fact that improved transparency and government support both operate 
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through the same channel (i.e., improvement in citizen trust) may indicate that they are 
substitutes. Without any government involvement, the creator’s effort to improve transparency 
may be critical in the success of crowd fundraising. On the other hand, with government 
participation or support, transparency may have a smaller impact. This “substitution hypothesis” 
indicates that government participation or support would negatively moderate the association 
between transparency and successful crowd fundraising.  
 
H3: Government participation or support of crowdfunding projects may work as 
substitutes for the creator’s effort to improve transparency (“substitution hypothesis”) 
 
4.3 Government Participation and Moral Hazard 
This research has proposed that, with government involvement, the crowd will be less 
concerned about the potential moral hazard of the creator. To be clear, however, we do not 
argue that the actual level of moral hazard (e.g., the creator’s embezzlement) would decrease 
with government participation or support. Of course, the level of moral hazard may decrease if 
government participation involves rigorous audits on how the contributed money is spent, but 
it is not clear as to whether the same will happen with other forms of government involvement 
(e.g., the government reviewing the feasibility and social desirability of projects). Although 
this issue may be related to the hypotheses that we formulated, the constructed dataset does not 
allow us to investigate this postulation. We thus leave this topic of research unexplored for 
future research.  
 
4.4 Summary: Theoretical Relationship 
The hypothesized relationships among government involvement, transparency, and 
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crowdfunding performance are visualized in Figure 1. The figure shows that the transparency 
of crowdfunding projects has a positive association with crowdfunding performance 
(hypothesis 1). Further, it is also clear from the figure that government involvement has a 
positive impact on crowdfunding performance holding the transparency level constant 
(hypothesis 2). Lastly, the figure describes the diminishing “public participation premium” in 
crowdfunding as the projects become increasingly transparent; the hypothesis is that 
government involvement and transparency work as if they were substitutes.  
 
5. METHODS AND DATA 
5.1 Method 
To evaluate the hypotheses proposed above, we collected data from a Korean crowdfunding 
platform from March to December 2016. We used the individual crowdfunding projects listed 
on the crowdfunding platform as the units of analysis. Our examination was to verify whether 
the crowdfunding projects with a higher level of transparency and/or government support were 
more successful, with all else being equal. Specifically, our model is as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛾 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖 (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the dependent variable (i.e., the crowdfunding performance) for a crowdfunding 
project i. We used two different indicators of performance: (1) the project success rate, as 
measured by the amount of contributions raised, divided by the project’s funding goal, and (2) 
the total amount of contributions raised through crowdfunding. Both were log-transformed to 
enable the interpretation of coefficients as percentage impacts. On the other hand, 𝑇𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖 
are the two treatment variables, the transparency level and an indicator of government support, 
respectively. Thus, the coefficients 𝜌 and 𝜏 are expected to both be positive, according to 
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hypotheses 1 and 2. The vector 𝑋𝑖 comprises a set of covariates, including the number of days 
the project was listed on the platform, an indicator of a “keep-it-all” type, and the funding goal 
of the project. 𝜆𝑖  indicates a list of dummy variables for various types of potential 
beneficiaries of the project, whereas 𝜈𝑖 is the error term.  
We also estimated the following equation to investigate the “substitution hypothesis,” 
namely whether the level of transparency matters less if the project is supported by 
governments, as the crowd will trust in the project even with a lack of transparency. In other 
words, we tested whether government support of a crowdfunding project mitigates the 
information asymmetry problem, thereby facilitating the outcomes of crowdfunding. We tested 
this argument with the following model: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑇𝑖𝑃𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛾 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖 (2) 
 
where the coefficient of the interaction term 𝜃 is of primary interest. We expected that the 
coefficient 𝜃 would be negative. Thus, the benefit of the creator’s efforts for maintaining 
transparency decreases when the crowdfunding project is supported by government agencies. 
In equation (2), the definitions of all the remaining variables are the same as in equation (1).  
 
5.2 Data  
The two dependent variables of this study are crowdfunding success rate and funding amount, 
whereas the two treatment variables comprise an indicator of government involvement and the 
transparency level of a project. The government involvement indicator is a dummy variable, 
with the value 1 if the project is supported by a government agency and 0 otherwise. This 
variable is easily identifiable as projects that received government support are announced by 
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the platform, for instance, by “this project is pursued as a collaboration with [the name of a 
public organization].”  
On the other hand, the other treatment variable, the transparency level, is a weighted 
average of three measures: (1) the number of communications between the creator and those 
visiting the site of the project, (2) the number of updates the creator posted, and (3) the 
measured level of detail of the plan on how the raised funds will be spent. Here, a 
“communication” is the comment the creator posted in response to questions posted on the 
platform (i.e., two-way communication), whereas an “update” is what the creator posted about 
the project’s progress (i.e., one-way communication). We also evaluated the creator’s spending 
plan for the raised funds. Some projects simply stated that, for example, “the raised fund will 
be used to support children with blood cancer,” while others had a much more detailed plan 
with information on the schedule, process, or specific beneficiaries. These three variables are 
standardized to have a zero mean and one standard deviation and are then averaged to yield the 
transparency variable.  
In addition, we collected a number of covariates. To begin with, we controlled for the 
number of days the project was listed on the platform (i.e., duration), as the crowdfunding 
outcomes may depend on how long funding had been solicited. Second, we also included an 
indicator of a “keep-it-all” type. In crowdfunding projects, a “keep-it-all” type involves a 
creator who keeps the entire amount raised, regardless of whether the outcome met their 
funding goal, whereas an “all-or-nothing” type involves a creator who keeps nothing if the goal 
is not achieved. Third, we controlled for the funding goal in models, with the amount of funding 
as the dependent variable. Fourth, we included a set of dummy variables indicating various 
types of potential beneficiaries of the project. The beneficiaries are categorized as the disabled, 
women, families in poverty, the elderly, multicultural families, foreign aid, cultural issues, and 
 18 
 
others.4 We decided to control for indicators of these categories, as crowdfunding outcomes 
may vary across them. Table 1 lists the summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. 
All data were collected from Wadiz. 
In this study, we analyzed 110 projects listed on the Wadiz platform as “public projects” 
from March to December 2016. Out of these 110 cases, 37 were pursued as collaborations 
between a governmental agency and private sector organizations, whereas the remaining 73 
were carried out solely by NPOs. The average funding goal was about 2.7 million KRW (which 
translates to about 2,500 USD per project), ranging approximately from 500 to 20,000 USD. 
Out of the 110 projects, foreign aid projects constitute the largest group in terms of intended 
beneficiaries with 16 projects, followed by cases that aim to support the elderly (13 projects), 
families in poverty (nine projects), cultural issues (nine projects), and the disabled (eight 
projects). On average, funding had been solicited for 29.4 days on the platform with a range of 
as short as ten days to as long as 105 days.  
 
6. RESULTS 
The results of our analyses are presented in Tables 2 and 3. In each of the tables, we used a 
different measure of crowdfunding performance as a dependent variable. In Table 2, the 
dependent variable is the crowdfunding success rate, as measured by the amount funded 
divided by the funding goal. To check the robustness of our finding, we repeated the same 
analysis in Table 3, with the total amount raised as the dependent variable.  
In Table 2, we demonstrate our results in four different models. All the presented models 
                                           
4 The group “others” refers to a project for which the beneficiary is not clear. For example, a project claimed 
that the amount raised will be spent to solve a dispute between Korea and Japan over the sovereignty of Dokdo 
island. Such a project is coded as “others” because beneficiaries are not specifically identified.  
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control for the covariates, including the set of dummy variables that indicate the project 
beneficiaries. In columns 1 to 3, we show that both government involvement and transparency 
have positive impacts on the project success rate. Specifically, findings suggest that the 
existence of government support is associated with an approximately 64% increase in the 
crowdfunding success rate (column 3 of Table 2). On the other hand, a one standard deviation 
increase in transparency is found to be associated with an approximately 41% increase in 
success rate (column 3 of Table 2). Overall, the findings provide support for hypotheses 1 and 
2.  
In column 4 of Table 2, we present our results with an addition of the interaction term 
between transparency and government support. As can be seen, the coefficient of the 
interaction term is significantly negative as hypothesized, which indicates that transparency 
and government involvement substitute each other to some extent; that is, the provision of 
government support is expected to yield a greater reward when the project is less transparent. 
Specifically, findings indicate that, in the absence of government support, a one standard 
deviation increase in transparency is associated with a success rate increase of about 72%. 
However, with government support, the same increase in transparency is associated with a mere 
23% increase in the performance measure.  
We confirmed the robustness of our findings in Table 3 by using an alternative measure 
of crowdfunding performance (i.e., total amount funded) as the dependent variable. In Table 3, 
we also included an additional variable (i.e., the funding goal) as a control variable, because 
the total amount raised may be significantly influenced by the targeted goal as set out by the 
creator. All the models in Table 3 control for the covariates, including the set of dummy 
variables, indicating the beneficiaries of the project as well as the funding goal. Since we log-
transformed the values of the two dependent variables in Tables 2 and 3, we can interpret the 
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coefficients as percentage changes, enabling us to directly compare the two sets of estimates. 
Overall, the results in Table 3 are largely consistent with what we found in Table 2.  
In column 4 of Table 3, we report our results with the interaction term between 
transparency and government support. Here again, the coefficients are very similar to what we 
found in column 4 of Table 2, providing support for the “substitution hypothesis.” Specifically, 
findings indicate that, in the absence of government support, a one standard deviation increase 
in transparency is associated with an approximately 75% increase in success rate. However, 
with government support, the same increase in transparency is associated with only a 28% 
increase in the performance measure. Overall, the results once again indicate that collaborative 
governance between public and private sector organizations yield a greater benefit when the 
project lacks transparency.  
Figure 2 shows the estimates from Table 2 graphically to refocus attention on the 
theoretical claim. The figure shows the relationship among government involvement, 
transparency of information, and our empirical measure of crowdfunding performance (i.e., the 
log-transformed success rate). We calculated the values in the figure directly from the 
coefficients in column 4 of Table 2. To do so, we set covariates at their mean values, took the 
product of the coefficients and values, and then summed up these quantities (3.78). We then 
added this value to those of different configurations of the key variables (i.e., transparency, 
government support, and the interaction between the two). In the figure, “high transparency” 
and “low transparency” are transparency variables that represent the mean plus one standard 
deviation and the mean minus one standard deviation, respectively. Figure 2 closely resembles 
the theoretical expectations appearing in Figure 1, providing empirical support for our 
hypotheses.  
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7. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR CROWDFUNDING 
In this study, we focused on highlighting the positive potential of governments’ use of 
crowdfunding. Like other modes of public sector innovation, however, public sector 
crowdfunding may also involve some potential risks. In this section, we propose a number of 
potentially negative aspects of public sector crowdfunding and discuss their implications for 
social welfare and public policymaking. Although we are not in a position to evaluate the full 
impact of public sector crowdfunding, given that the new technology is still in its infancy, we 
believe it is meaningful to consider the prospect of its wider consequences.  
First, a critical concern may be that the rise of public sector crowdfunding may incentivize 
governments to pursue “hidden privatization”; governments downsize their roles and instead 
use the new technology to outsource public services. It is well reported that privatization (or 
outsourcing) may sometimes undermine the quality of public services due to private operators’ 
opportunism (e.g., Van Slyke, 2006). Indeed, private partners’ opportunistic behavior may still 
be a problem in the crowdfunding of public services. For instance, the creator may embezzle 
the collected contributions. However, an advantage of public sector crowdfunding is that it 
allows crowdfunders to provide regular feedback to the operators by voting online with their 
dollars, which makes operators’ opportunism less likely than in typical cases of privatization.5  
Further, the crowdfunding projects are funded by voluntary contributions, which differs 
from taxpayer-funded government programs. Previous research has demonstrated that taxation 
can undermine the productivity of our economy by distorting the behaviors of taxpayers 
(Sandmo, 1976); for instance, higher tax rates cause workers to work less and entrepreneurs to 
invest less. However, there is no theoretical reason to believe that such a decrease in 
                                           
5 In many cases, public sector projects take several years to complete, and may involve several rounds of 
crowdfunding.  
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productivity exists in the case of crowdfunding. Therefore, with the quality of the services 
being equal, crowdfunding is preferred to tax-funded government operations. For instance, if 
school administrators use crowdfunding to purchase school equipment in times of austerity, 
there is no reason to oppose it as students are better off without making anyone worse off (and 
also without reducing anyone’s productivity). Of course, to make the crowdfunding a success, 
school administrators should make a persuasive case that the school equipment will greatly 
improve the quality of school service. 
Another concern may be related to the government’s steering capacity; governments can 
choose certain social problems while discriminating against others. In public sector 
crowdfunding, however, the financial resources come from the crowd rather than from the 
government. Both the social problems identified by the government and solutions proposed by 
the NPOs should face public evaluations on the platform of whether there exists sufficiently 
high demand (i.e., needs) from the citizenry. Indeed, public sector crowdfunding may reduce, 
not reinforce, governments’ discretionary power of discriminating against certain groups of 
social members.  
Nevertheless, we do not argue that public sector crowdfunding is a panacea. One potential 
problem of this innovation is that the crowdfunding platform may employ a selection 
mechanism that prefers a certain type of project over another. That is, there may be inherent 
biases built into the crowdfunding process. For instance, previous studies have consistently 
demonstrated that polarized, distinct, and extreme ideas tend to attract more attention on many 
Internet-based platforms (Hong 2013; Hong & Kim, 2016; Kim & Hong, 2015; Sunstein, 2018). 
This evidence may indicate that, if all else being equal, politically contentious ideas may attract 
more contributions on the platform than moderate ones. Further, the government’s reliance on 
crowdfunding may also create equity concerns with regard to the revenue-raising capabilities 
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of different communities. Previous research has found some evidence that the use of local 
option sales taxes (special-purpose taxes levied at the local level) exacerbated existing fiscal 
disparity across localities (Afonso, 2016; Zhao & Hou, 2008). Similar concerns may emerge 
regarding the government’s use of crowdfunding if the fundraising is significantly more 
successful in wealthier communities than in less affluent counterparts. That is, the 
government’s use of crowdfunding may introduce a new source of fiscal inequality across 
localities.  
A potentially more critical problem may be that public sector crowdfunding involves a 
high level of uncertainty in terms of future contributions from the crowd. It thus cannot be used 
to fund public services that require sustainable financial support over a long period. One 
possible solution may be that governments make a binding commitment to fund the residual 
amounts (i.e., the amounts that were not successfully raised from the crowd). However, such 
government commitment may crowd out voluntary contributions from the public, undermining 
the utility of the innovation. Further, philanthropic crowdfunding may not be successful if used 
to fund projects that require a large amount of funding. For instance, the average funding goal 
of the projects we analyzed was about 2,500 USD per project, which is relatively small. 
Without any provision of substantive rewards to funders, it is unclear whether public sector 
crowdfunding can be applied to fund long-term projects requiring a sizeable amount of 
contributions.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
This research explored whether and to what extent collaborative governance between public 
and private sectors could improve the outcomes of crowd-based financing. Among many forms 
of collaborative governance, we focused on the partnerships between government agencies and 
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NPOs in the context of philanthropic crowdfunding. Such a public-private partnership in 
crowdfunding may be potentially beneficial to both parties; from the viewpoint of philanthropy, 
NPOs may collect a greater amount of donations using crowdfunding, whereas, from the 
viewpoint of government agencies, they may achieve public missions with substantially lower 
spending, which could free governments that are under fiscal distress of funding social 
programs. 
The availability of crowdfunding as a mode of financing could certainly present an 
opportunity for private sector organizations, but the performance may be limited because of 
information asymmetry between the creators and funders. This issue may be especially 
pronounced in philanthropic crowdfunding, as NPOs should collect contributions from the 
broad public (i.e., the crowd) who has little knowledge about their business and operations. 
Due to information asymmetry, the creator may suffer moral hazards, and the funders may be 
unwilling to donate, anticipating the creator’s moral hazard.  
In this study, we explored whether and to what extent the partnerships between 
government agencies and NPOs could help to mitigate the information asymmetry problem, 
thereby improving crowdfunding performance. Our sample includes philanthropic 
crowdfunding projects created by NPOs for achieving public missions. We examined whether 
the projects with government support achieved a greater success rate or collected a greater 
amount of funding than comparable projects without any government involvement. Our 
findings indicate that the existence of government support is associated with a 64% increase in 
crowdfunding success rate and a 55% increase in the crowdfunding amount.  
We then hypothesized that government involvement provides some type of accreditation 
or certification, attesting that the projects aim to achieve public rather than private goals, thereby 
improving citizen trust and mitigating the information asymmetry problem. The fact that 
 25 
 
government participation or support alleviates information asymmetry between creators and 
funders may indicate that it substitutes the creator’s efforts toward project transparency. This 
research tests this “substitution hypothesis” between government support and transparency. We 
find that the positive impact of government support on crowdfunding success rates or funding 
amounts is significantly greater when the transparency level of the project is relatively low. 
This finding is suggestive but compelling evidence that the positive impact of government 
involvement stems primarily from alleviating citizens’ concern of moral hazard and from 
promoting their trust in the projects.  
The combined evidence of this study shows the potential that governments may actively 
take advantage of crowdfunding to achieve collaborative innovation and public goals. This 
collaborative financing may be especially beneficial for governments under fiscal distress; 
public missions may be pursued with voluntary contributions by the citizenry rather than 
through costly taxation. In other words, governments under fiscal distress may take advantage 
of this crowd-based financing to “co-fund” public projects with the citizenry. Moreover, 
governments may also use crowdfunding to gauge the collective needs for the project under 
consideration; crowdfunding allows governments to observe the aggregate amount of what 
citizens are willing to pay to bring the project into reality, and citizens can “vote with their 
dollars” online. These benefits may, of course, accrue in any charitable crowdfunding, even 
without any government involvement. However, our evidence shows that government 
involvement may certainly help realize these benefits by alleviating the information asymmetry 
problem.  
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Figure 1. Theoretical Relationship among Government Support, Transparency, and 
Crowdfunding Performance 
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Figure 2. Empirical Relationship among Government Support, Transparency, and 
Crowdfunding Performance 
 
 
 
Note: The values in this figure are based on the coefficients in column 4 of Table 2, and were calculated directly 
from the coefficients. To do so, we set covariates at their mean values, took the product of the coefficients and 
values, and then summed up these quantities (3.78). We then added this value to what we obtained for different 
configurations of the key variables (i.e., transparency, government support, and the interaction between the two). 
In the figure, “high transparency” and “low transparency” are defined as transparency variables, representing the 
mean plus one standard deviation and the mean minus one standard deviation, respectively. 
 
 
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Low Transparency High Transparency
C
ro
w
d
fu
n
d
in
g
 P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
Without Government Support
With Government Support
 28 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Success rate (in log) 3.976 1.41 0 6.915 
Funding amount (in log) 13.88 1.40 9.210 16.09 
Transparency 0.000 0.695 -1.008 3.566 
Government support 0.336 0.475 0 1 
Duration (in log) 3.359 0.340 2.398 4.663 
Keep-it-all type 0.182 0.387 0 1 
Funding goal (in log) 14.51 0.704 13.12 16.81 
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Table 2. Government Support and the Performance of Crowdfunding 
 Dependent Variable: 
Crowdfunding Success Rate (in log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government Support (0 or 1) 0.748**  0.637** 0.649** 
 (0.305)  (0.292) (0.285) 
     
Transparency   0.644** 0.596** 1.036** 
  (0.143) (0.150) (0.299) 
     
Transparency x Government Support (0 or 1)    -0.703** 
    (0.335) 
     
Duration (in log)  0.156 0.076 -0.017 -0.135 
 (0.461) (0.467) (0.457) (0.454) 
     
Keep-it-all Type (0 or 1) -0.550 -0.892** -0.668* -0.716** 
 (0.348) (0.317) (0.339) (0.341) 
     
Constant 3.256* 3.497** 3.519** 4.218** 
 (1.642) (1.683) (1.638) (1.604) 
N 110 110 110 110 
R2 0.150 0.191 0.226 0.250 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; all models include a set of dummy variables for various types of beneficiaries of the project. 
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Table 3. Government Support and the Performance of Crowdfunding 
 Dependent Variable: 
The Amount of Crowdfunded Contributions (in log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government Support (0 or 1) 0.683**  0.550* 0.563* 
 (0.308)  (0.297) (0.291) 
     
Transparency  0.699** 0.653** 1.072** 
  (0.134) (0.142) (0.268) 
     
Transparency x Government Support (0 or 1)    -0.672** 
    (0.319) 
     
Duration (in log) 0.060 -0.077 -0.146 -0.257 
 (0.446) (0.444) (0.438) (0.436) 
     
Keep-it-all Type (0 or 1) -0.407 -0.690** -0.511 -0.560* 
 (0.339) (0.310) (0.324) (0.325) 
     
Funding Goal (in log) 0.562** 0.447** 0.486** 0.496** 
 (0.205) (0.193) (0.199) (0.203) 
     
Constant 5.478 7.541** 6.943** 7.462** 
 (3.303) (3.135) (3.243) (3.235) 
N 110 110 110 110 
R2 0.173 0.238 0.265 0.287 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; all models include a set of dummy variables for various types of beneficiaries of the project. 
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